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Abstract 
In recent years, many developing countries having a history of high inflation, unfavorable 
balance of payment situation and a high level of foreign currencies denominated debt, 
have switched or are in the process of switching to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
Therefore, the stability of the exchange rate and the dynamics of its volatility are more 
crucial than before to prevent financial crises and macroeconomic disturbances. This paper 
is designed to find out the reasons behind Bangladesh’s exit to floating exchange rate 
system and evaluate its performance under the new regime. It’s found that, the shift to 
market based floating exchange rate for the Taka was a major step towards protecting the 
country’s external competitiveness and insulating the country from adverse external shocks. 
The comparisons of selected economic indicators during the first three year’s experience 
under the new regime showed an impressive effect on the economy of Bangladesh specially 
export growth, low volatility of exchange rate, towering foreign exchange reserve etc. 
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I. Introduction: 
Due to wide economic and financial diversity among the developing countries of the world, 
the observed differences among their exchange rate regimes - from hard peg to free float and 
some combinations of these two extremes, are not at all surprising. These variations in the 
exchange rate regimes are due to the fact that, suitable exchange rate regime for a particular 
country depends on the level of its economic development and the extent of involvement with 
the global financial markets. However, the precise relationship between the circumstances of 
a country and the exchange rate regime that is most likely to suit its economic interest has 
still remained a matter of controversy. 
 
Recent devastating financial crises involving a number of developing and transition 
countries, made the economist’s views on exchange rate regimes to evolve significantly. 
Proponents of pegged exchange rate regimes argue that they provide more credibility, stable 
economic environment and faster economic growth. On the other hand, critics concluded that 
pegged regimes are inherently crisis-prone while flexible regimes allow large adverse shocks 
to be easily absorbed. While this debate is still continuing, recent experience of major 
financial crises reveals one fact that the intermediate regimes (adjustable peg, crawling peg, 
basket peg and target zone) are loosing adept and popularity as they have been at the center 
stage in most of the crises. As an alternative, countries are tending to adopt either of the two 
extremes, hard peg or perfectly free float, a symptom termed as ―hollowing of the middle‖ or 
―bipolar view‖. Various studies focusing on the evolution of exchange rate regimes during 
the past decade, have indeed provided some support for this view. 
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One of the countries that most recently joined this procession, is Bangladesh. In the 
recent world economic outlook published by International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh was 
placed in the group of Asian developing countries, which until the month of May 2003, had 
been operating under pegged exchange rate system of one kind or another. After gaining 
independence in 1971, the exchange rate of the Taka was fixed against the pound sterling. In 
1979, the Government adopted an adjustable basket peg using a real effective exchange rate 
(REER) target. The peg rate was occasionally adjusted with an aim to maintain the trend of 
real effective exchange rate index based on a trade-weighted basket of currencies of major 
trade partners. Until 1983, the pound sterling was used as the intervention policy, which was 
later replaced by US dollar. 
 
  On the 3rd of December 2000, Bangladesh bank adopted the practice of declaring a 
fifty paisa band width for its transaction with banks, which was later widened to one taka 
from 25th May 2001. Bangladesh Bank supported the parity of Taka through a continuous 
presence in the market in the form of announced readiness to undertake US dollar purchases 
and sales at rates decided by itself within the declared rate band at any time an authorized 
dealer approaches.  
 
Bangladesh had been pursuing an active exchange policy, which was reflected in the 
frequency of nominal exchange rate changes announced by the central bank. From 1983 
onwards, Bangladesh Bank decided to depreciate the currency 83 times, while only 6 times 
the currency was appreciated in the nominal sense (See Islam, 2003). The exchange rate 
policy decisions, though notified in all cases by the Bangladesh Bank, were made on behalf 
of and in close consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Bangladesh Bank was not in the 
role of independent stewardship of exchange rate policy. 
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On the 31st of May 2003, Bangladesh adopted fully market-based floating exchange 
rate system. From then on, Bangladesh bank notified that it would no longer maintain a 
preannounced exchange rate bands for transactions with banks and the banks will fix buying 
and selling rates of dollar and other currencies according to supply and demand situation in 
the market. But Bangladesh Bank also pledged that it would scrutinize the market and 
intervene in the money market and US dollar transactions, iff needed to ensure orderly 
conditions in the market. 
 
Like many other economic decisions, the decision of Bangladesh Government to 
adopt market based floating exchange rate system was not beyond controversy. Advocates in 
favor of the decision were saying that, the move was pragmatic and timely and would help 
Bangladesh to revive its competitiveness in the international market and would increase 
Government’s commitment to the market. On the other hand, critics were arguing that the 
economic and financial strength of Bangladesh was not good enough to successfully operate 
under the chosen regime and predicted that it might create excess volatility in the exchange 
market and as a result would adversely affect international trade and investment. 
 
The main motivation of this paper arose from the extent of the above debate and 
hence it will attempt to reach a solution. On the way to do that, the paper is developed to find 
out answers to the following two key questions: 
 
1. Why Bangladesh adopted market based floating exchange rate in May 2003? 
2. Whether the effects of this policy change on the economy went in favor of 
Bangladesh or not in during the three fiscal years 2003-2006? 
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Organization of the paper: 
Section II and section III describes the data and methodology. In section IV, this paper tends 
to find out the determinants of an exchange rate regime, which may be suitable for a country 
and its characteristics from recent literatures on exchange rate regime determination. Having 
done this, this paper then turns to find answers to the key questions noted earlier. Section V 
analyzes the reasons, which led Bangladesh to exit to a flexible exchange rate regime. And in 
section VI, an attempt is made to characterize the exchange rate regimes and evaluate the 
impact of the decision to exit based on some selected economic indicators. Finally, in section 
VII, an overall conclusion will be drawn on the topic. 
 
II. Source of data: 
The calculations, graphs, tables, which are used and shown in this paper, all are based on the 
data obtained from the Economic trends, published by the statistics department of the central 
bank of Bangladesh , official website of the central bank, ministry of finance and export 
promotion bureau of Bangladesh and the world economic outlook 2004, published by 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
III. Methodology: 
In order to figure out the reasons behind the exchange rate policy change in Bangladesh,  
yearly data from fiscal year 1990-91 to 2002-03 of several indicators of internal sustainability 
and competitiveness of the country is used.Though Bangladesh adopted the floating regime 
one month before the end of the fiscal year 2002-03 that is in May’03, in order to find out 
whether there is any structural change in the performance of the key economic indicators, 
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monthly data over three post-regime fiscal years (July, 03-June, 06) is compared with that of 
the three pre-exit fiscal years (July,00- June,03) because of uniformity and computational 
advantage. Also to estimate the weight Bangladesh assigns to another six major world 
currencies, two separate regression analysis is used through the two time periods. 
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IV. Literature review on exchange rate regime determinants: 
Devastating financial crises and macroeconomic disturbances experienced by a number of the 
developing countries like Chile (1982), Mexico (1994-95), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), 
Ecuador (1999), Turkey (2000-01) and Argentina (2001-02) started the debate over how the 
choice of exchange rate regime may contribute to macroeconomic stability and strength and 
how a shift in exchange rate regime might contribute to improved macroeconomic 
performance. The choices are a floating exchange rate, a fixed exchange rate, or an 
intermediate path, like fixed but adjustable. Many countries choose an intermediate exchange 
rate regime that is often stabilized by the central bank, but may sometimes shift, often known 
as a ―soft peg.‖ However, in the aftermath of the macroeconomic crisis across East Asia in 
1997-98, a view emerged that this exchange rate regime (soft peg) was in part responsible for 
the depth of this macroeconomic crisis. (See Calvo and Mishkin, 2003) 
 
One often-told lesson of the East Asian experience is that nations must make a 
bipolar choice: according to which hard pegs and free floats are the only viable alternatives 
with highly integrated international financial markets and most of the current debate on the 
choice of an exchange rate regime has focused on this. The paper by Bubula and Otker-Robe 
(2002) provides a good illustration of the bipolar view between 1990 and 2001, and the 
concomitant reduction in the proportion of ―soft‖ or intermediate regimes. For the IMF 
membership as a whole, the share of hard pegs (which include formal dollarization, currency 
unions, and currency boards) increased from 15.7 to 25.8 percent, whereas the share of 
floating regimes rose from 15.1 to 35.5 percent. In addition, exits from intermediate regimes 
in developing countries took the form mostly of a switch to a floating rate regime, rather than 
a move to a hard peg. Indeed, for the sole group of developing countries, the share of hard 
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pegs rose from 18.4 percent to only 21.6 percent, whereas the share of floating regimes 
increased from 13.2 to 34.6 percent. (See table 1 in Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2002) Switches 
from intermediate regimes to a floating rate arrangement have often occurred in the context 
of a currency crisis. Evidence by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) suggests indeed that 
intermediate exchange rate regimes tend to be more crisis-prone than hard pegs or floating 
exchange rate arrangements. 
 
Several empirical studies have attempted to find out the determinants of exchange 
rate regime switch and strengthen the fact that systematic prediction of exchange rate choice 
is not easy. Deciding which exchange rate regime is appropriate for a particular country is 
thus really an arduous task and it depends on the specific circumstances of the country in 
question and depending on the time period when the decision is needed to be taken. In other 
way, there is no single currency regime, which is either best for all countries or even best for 
the same country in all time. (Frankel, 1999) 
 
A review of some collection of previous studies shows that different empirical studies 
using the de jure and other de facto regime classifications2 have often obtained different 
results. Although certain characteristics have been shown to be important in determining 
exchange rate regime choice in certain groups of countries, and certain characteristics may 
distinguish countries in certain regimes from those in other regimes.  
                                                   
2
 The ―de jure‖ classification  is given in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAR) which is self declared by the member countries and the ―de facto‖ classification 
is based on countries actual exchange rate behavior, rather than what they claim. 
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H.Poirson (2001) showed that country’s exchange regime decisions reflect primarily 
on their size, vulnerability to external shocks, inflation, product diversification, capital 
mobility, level of reserves, political stability, and temptation to inflate by the government. 
Poirson conducted regression for 93 developing countries using the new IMF classification of 
countries exchange rate regime over 1990-98 and, asserted that size of the economy, 
production diversification, external vulnerability, political instability and low reserves all 
tend to increase flexibility. And high exchange rate risk exposure and a high government 
temptation to inflate tend to decrease flexibility. Based on their findings they forecasted that, 
the trend toward increased flexibility observed in recent years could be expected to continue 
as more countries become financially integrated, macro economically stable and gain the 
ability to hedge their exchange rate risk exposure. 
 
A. Alesina and A. Wagner (2003) showed that countries with high level of foreign 
denominated liabilities, with relatively poor political institutions are less capable to stick to 
their announcements of fixing and break commitments to pegging. This is due to the fact that 
their poor quality governments make them unable to maintain macroeconomic stability, 
which is a precondition for holding pegs. On the other hand, they found that countries with 
good institutions display fear of floating and they float less than announced. 
 
Two other schools of thoughts recently came into light in determining countries 
exchange rate regimes. According to the political economy theories, a country which is 
politically instable may have an incentive to adopt floating exchange rate system as it lacks 
the political ability and support for the unpopular measures that may be required to defend a 
peg. According to Collins (1996), under a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate 
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changes are less highly visible to the public and consequently less politically costly than 
devaluation under a peg. 
 
According the fear of floating approach, pioneered by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), 
countries with high unhedged foreign currency denominated debt and a correspondingly high 
exchange rate risk exposure have an incentive to stick to peg to the foreign currency in which 
it borrowed, even if they officially declared as floaters. 
 
R. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), using countries de facto exchange rate regimes 
during the period 1985-2002, analyzes the determinants of exits from regimes, where exits 
involve shift to more or less flexible regimes compared to the prevailing one or adjustments 
within the existing regime. The paper also distinguishes orderly exits from disorderly ones. 
Orderly exits don’t follow any exchange market pressures but are related to changes in the 
objective determinants of the economy. Orderly shifts to more flexible regimes are associated 
with emerging and non-emerging developing countries, with an increase in trade openness 
and a measure of monetary relaxation proxied by growth in government borrowing from 
banks. To the extent that trade openness implies greater exposure to external shocks (such as 
deterioration in the terms of trade, or a recession in partner countries), the shift to a more 
flexible regime may be viewed as an attempt to insulate the economy better from these 
shocks. On the other hand, disorderly exits are driven by pressures emanating from exchange 
market, which may lead to a currency crisis. They established a significant link between 
deterioration of economic health and crises episodes, which are associated with a decline in 
export growth, official foreign reserves, and appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
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Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks and Oomes (2003), using recent advances in the 
classification of exchange rate regimes, showed that countries having stronger links to 
international capital markets, facing a variety of institutional weakness which lead to higher 
inflation, having problems of debt sustainability, fragile banking systems, and other sources 
of macroeconomic volatility find it hard to keep their exchange rate systems pegged due to 
non credibility of policymakers. Also as countries develop economically and institutionally, 
adopting flexible exchange rate regime is a better option. And the countries having relatively 
limited financial market development and relatively closed capital markets, fixed exchange 
rate regimes provides some measure of credibility without compromising growth objectives. 
 
According to Agenor.P.Richard (2004), countries that choose to exit from an 
exchange rate peg or a currency band regime have typically faced one (or several) of three 
types of problems: 
(i) An unsustainable real exchange rate misalignment coupled with growing external 
imbalances and persistent losses in foreign-currency reserves; (ii) inability to use interest 
rates or to maintain them at sufficiently high levels to defend the currency, despite continuous 
market pressures; (iii) highly volatile capital flows that tend to affect domestic liquidity and 
create macroeconomic instability. These factors may also be at play under a band regime, if 
the upper margin is not high enough to allow a sufficient depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. 
 
As was noted earlier, developing countries mostly prefer to adopt a floating exchange 
rate regime as an alternative to their intermediate regime rather than choosing a hard peg. 
This is due to the growing arguments in favor of the shock absorption capacity and growth 
incentives provided by floating exchange rate regime. Mussa and others (2000) asserted that 
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in order to adapt to expanding opportunities from deeper involvement in international trade 
and finance, developing and transition countries have been shifting towards greater 
flexibility. While, countries that are tightening their links with modern, global financial 
markets are increasingly vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment, making the defense of 
pegged rates substantially more difficult. 
 
Broda (2001 &2002) finds evidence that terms of trade shocks are amplified in 
countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. He showed that short run real GDP 
responses to real shocks are significantly smoother in floats than in pegs. Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2003) take that empirical analysis one step further. Based on a sample covering 183 
countries (including Bangladesh as a non-industrial country) during the period 1974-2000, 
they found evidence in support of the view that countries with flexible exchange rates are 
better able to accommodate real external shocks and also controlling for other factors, 
sensitivity of real growth to terms of trade shocks declines with the rising degree of flexibility 
of the exchange rate regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) also reported in favor of 
this view. They suggested that exchange rate regimes indeed matter in terms of real economic 
performance for nonindustrial countries. They particularly found that in non-industrial 
countries (Bangladesh was included in their dataset as a nonindustrial country), fixed 
exchange rate regimes are connected with slower growth rates and higher output volatility. 
 
According to Edwards (2004), countries having more flexible exchange rate regimes 
are able to accommodate better from a current account reversal shocks (defined as a 
reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4 percent of GDP in one year) than 
countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes. Thus, greater openness and exposure to 
current account shocks may induce countries to choose a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
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V. Bangladesh case: Reasons behind exit: 
In order to figure out the reasons behind the exchange rate policy change in Bangladesh, this 
section will discuss the behaviour of several indicators of internal sustainability and 
competitiveness of the country and in most of the cases this is done using yearly data from 
fiscal year 1990-91 to 2002-03. An analysis based on the findings will be done in section 3.8. 
 
5.1 Foreign currency liquidity: 
The level of official international reserves as a percentage of imports measures foreign 
currency liquidity. Foreign currency liquidity was highest in 1993-94 at the level of 65.97 
percent. After that, the liquidity was showing a falling trend and it reached the lowest level in 
2000-01,when the official foreign reserve stood only at US$ 1306.7 million, the lowest ever 
after 1990-91.Though, after 2001, the liquidity began to rise, but this is due to the 
improvement in foreign remittance inflows. Even after that, foreign currency liquidity 
situation in Bangladesh is considered poor and it stood at only 25.57 percent in 2002-03. (See 
figure 1) 
 
5.2 Inflation Differential: 
In a country where domestic inflation displays a persistent tendency to exceed levels in 
trading partners, maintaining a currency peg (or a regime with relatively narrow bands) may 
lead to a significant real appreciation, thereby hurting exports and putting pressure on official 
reserves—eventually undermining the ability of the Central Bank to defend the peg. 
According to IMF world economic outlook database 2004, domestic inflation of Bangladesh 
has been consistently increasing compared to its main trading partners, United States, United 
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Kingdom, Germany and France since 1997.3(See figure 2)This as described above may lead 
to significant real effective exchange rate appreciation of Bangladesh. 
 
5.3 A change in external competitiveness:  
Real exchange rate appreciation is often blamed to be the major cause of slow real sector 
recovery and negative trade balance, which may lead to chronic current account deficits. 
The REER of Bangladesh was depreciating until 1998-99 compared to the base year 
1995.But after that it was appreciating continuously until 2002-03, reached 97.98 which 
was almost a 12 percent appreciation from 1998-99.(See figure 3) 
 
Although as earlier said, Bangladesh had been quiet frequent in changing its 
exchange rate and also widened its band width, that was not enough to convince the market 
that the currency was depreciating fast enough to maintain competitiveness and contain 
external imbalances. According to Agenor (2004), in such a case, anticipations of a discrete 
adjustment in the exchange rate may persist and reserve losses will continue and this will 
force the country to an eventual exit—possibly through a crisis. 
 
5.4 Credits to Government by the banking system: 
Government borrowing from the banking system as percentage of GDP can be used as a 
proxy for monetary expansion, which in case of Bangladesh almost steadily increased from 
3.57% in 1990-91 to highest ever 9.46% in 2001-02.(See figure 4). 
 
 
                                                   
3
Germany and France are the largest importers of export goods from Bangladesh among the EURO area. 
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5.5 Foreign currency denominated debt: 
The increasing trend of foreign denominated liabilities of Bangladesh is another thing which 
should have brought into consideration. Total outstanding foreign debt stood at $17411 by 
the end of 2002-03, which is a 36.94% rise from that in 1990-91. (See figure 5). 
 
5.6 Export performance: 
Export performance is measured by the annual growth in export revenue. Economic health of 
a country is considered to be deteriorating when its export sector shows sluggishness. During 
most of the 1990s, export performance of Bangladesh was impressive. But recent export 
performance indicates that Bangladesh is loosing its competitiveness in this sector. In all the 
years except 2001-02 in the dataset, Bangladesh was showing positive growth rate of exports 
revenue. But a closure look at the data will give a rather different result. While growth rate of 
export revenue was 107.6percent in 1994-95 compared to 1990-91, in the next five years the 
growth rate was only 47.6percent. It’s still impressive for Bangladesh, but gives evidence in 
support of its suffering export sector. And finally in 2001-02 the export revenue showed 
negative growth rate for the first time in the time span of the data set. However in 2002-03, 
export receipts again recorded positive growth of 9.4 percent from that of the previous fiscal 
year. (See figure 6).  
 
The main characteristic of Bangladesh export sector is that it depends heavily on the 
exports of textiles and clothing, or ready-made garments. The RMG industry has been the 
main source of growth in exports and formal employment in Bangladesh over the past years. 
Table 1 shows how rapidly the RMG exports of Bangladesh grew over the years. The value 
of exports in US dollars increased almost six folds (5.6) during the period 1990-91 to 2000-
2001 before the first ever-negative growth rate of 5.7 percent in 2001-02.  
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As a whole, countries of EU and United states were the highest buyers of 
Bangladeshi products over the past years. Of the total export from Bangladesh during fiscal 
year 2002-03, export to EU countries stood at $2404.47 million, which was 36.7 percent of 
the countries total export. Next to EU countries, goods worth of $2155.45 million were 
exported to the United States, which is 32.91 percent of countries total export in the same 
fiscal year. Other than these, United Kingdom imported 11.88 percent of the countries total 
export. 
 
The high concentration of exports in the economy provides a strong argument in 
favor of a more flexible exchange rate regime. If an economy is sectorally diversified in 
terms of production and exports, then a real external shock in any particular sector will be 
less significant to the economy as a whole as that industry represents a small proportion of 
the national output as a whole. Positive shock in one sector can offset negative shocks in 
other. As a whole, aggregate shock could be mitigated. But in case of Bangladesh, as we have 
seen, the export is concentrated particularly in one sector and limited world market; this 
makes Bangladesh vulnerable to an external shock. 
 
One other aspect of Bangladesh export sector is that it depends on quota-restrained 
markets for about 94percent of its RMG exports. Recent export performance of Bangladesh 
indicates that Bangladesh may not be sufficiently competitive to maintain its share in a quota-
free world market after 2004, as under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and clothing, all 
textile and clothing quotas maintained by industrial countries under the Multifiber 
Arrangement would be removed over the period 1995-2005. With the final phase out of the 
MFA next year, the relatively secured market access in the USA under the quota regime will 
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come to an end. Thus, the balance of payments consequence of a sharp decline in RMG 
exports could be severe. 
 
According to a most recent IMF report, relatively weak competitiveness makes the 
Bangladeshi economy highly vulnerable to the final stage of the quota phase-out and 
Bangladesh’s exports could fall substantially in the wake of quota removal, and its balance of 
payments position could be weakened considerably. The resulting pressures on production 
and employment could also be severe. (See Mlachila and Yangi, 2004) 
 
With the phasing out of quota advantage from the MFA after 2004, it is very urgent 
for Bangladesh economy to look for access to new markets to compensate for the likely loss 
of market share in the existing secured markets in the West. Other than the RMG, other 
manufactured exports such as light engineering products, e.g. bicycle, ceramics, toiletries, 
horticulture products have good export growth potential in the neighboring new markets and 
in the West. But successful diversification of the export basket will depend significantly on 
the competitiveness of Bangladeshi export products compared to its rivals. 
 
5.7 Trade openness:  
The degree of openness of an economy influences a countries choice of exchange rate regime 
in several ways. Degree of openness influences the cost of adjustment to external 
disturbances. Trade openness implies greater exposure to external shocks (such as 
deterioration in the terms of trade, or a recession in partner countries). To insulate the 
economy from these kinds of shocks, the shift to a more flexible regime may be prudent. 
Trade openness can be expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
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Consistent with the trends of the market economy, Uruguay Round Accord and 
agreement with World Trade Organization (WTO), Bangladesh has been pursuing a liberal 
trade policy since 1990s.Extensive reform programmes have been implemented in trade 
regime during the last two decades. Reforms have been initiated to dismantle tariff and non-
tariff barriers. As a result of this, the degree of trade openness in Bangladesh, has been 
showing an increasing trend since 1990-91.It increased from 15.5 percent in 1990-91 to 30 
percent in 2001-02. (See figure 7). 
 
5.8 Terms of trade: 
Terms of trade are an index of the price of a country's exports in terms of its imports. The 
terms of trade are said to improve if that index rises and vice versa. Since 1997-1998, 
Bangladesh was showing a continuous deterioration in the terms of trade. This was 
because of higher percentage increase in import price index than that of the export price 
index. Though from 1998 to 2003, export price index increased by 14.1percent, but this was 
overshadowed by a much larger 37.62percent increase in the import price index. As a result, 
the terms of trade deteriorated by 17.1percent in fiscal year 2002-03 from the year 1997-98. 
(See figure 8). 
 
5.9 Balance of payment position: 
Bangladesh has been experiencing a continuous trade deficit through out the past years. 
Trade deficit stood a record high in fiscal year 2002-03 which was a 22percent jump from its 
previous fiscal year. 
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But interesting thing is that, having such a huge a trade deficit, current account 
balance account showed positive amount in last two fiscal years, which in fiscal year 2002-
03, increased 51.2percent from that of the previous year. This is due to increasing flow of 
remittance from expatriate Bangladeshi workers. Although the chronic trade deficit is masked 
by incoming remittance flow, it is a matter of concern for Bangladesh economy. 
 
Overall balance position was also in favor of Bangladesh during the last two fiscal 
years .The overall balance stood at US $ 365 million in 2001-02 compared to a negative 
balance of $226 million in 2000-01.The balance continued to improve and reached $815 
million in 2002-03.(See table 2) 
 
5.10 Analysis of the findings: 
The reasons behind adopting a particular exchange rate regime should be linked to the failure 
or under performance of the preceding regime. Under the previous regime, the real effective 
exchange rate of Bangladesh was appreciating due to rising differential of the countries 
inflation relative to its trading partners. The countries falling international competitiveness 
and stagnating export performance hinges on this appreciating REER. The situation complies 
with the first of the three reasons behind a country’s move to more flexible exchange rate 
regime pointed by Agenor (2004). 
 
Even though the frequency of the exchange rate adjustment has increased since the 
adoption of real effective exchange rate approach to exchange rate policy in 1979, the 
adjustment had not necessarily been complete. As described by Hossain (2002), any policy of 
full adjustment was not strictly followed in Bangladesh through the 1990s, plausibly because 
of the political sensitivity of devaluation. The nominal exchange rate depreciation was not in 
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line with the increasing inflation differential with its trade partners. As advised by him, the 
new regime is expected to reduce the political sensitivity of devaluation provided that 
devaluation takes place on a small scale and on a steady basis. This is in line with the 
findings of Collins (1996) that under a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate changes 
are less highly visible to the public and consequently less politically costly than devaluation 
under a peg. 
 
Also, according to the findings of R. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), 
Bangladesh’s exit to a floating exchange rate regime may be termed as an orderly one to 
prevent any possible exchange market crisis. This can be inferred from the fact that the 
economic health of Bangladesh was deteriorating as three indicators were showing 
weakening trends and this could have made Bangladesh economy vulnerable to exchange 
market pressure under the old regime. This is another reason, which might have worked 
behind the decision to exit. Moreover relatively poor political institutions made Bangladesh 
less capable of holding the peg under high level of foreign denominated debt as dictated by 
A. Alesina and A. Wagner (2003). 
 
The increasing trade openness of Bangladesh was expected to combine with it greater 
exposure to external shocks. The deteriorating terms of trade of Bangladesh could be linked 
with this. The real growth of Bangladesh will be expected to show less sensitivity to further 
decline in terms of trade under the new regime, as the findings of Broda (2001) and Levy-
Yeyati (2003) dictated. 
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 Also, with the abolition of quota advantage from the multi fibre arrangement from 
2005, it is expected that Bangladesh will face a severe balance of payment shock and current 
account reversals. As, pointed by Edwards (2004) openness and exposure to current account 
shocks may induce countries to choose a more flexible exchange rate regime which will help 
the country to accommodate such shocks, gives a strong support for the regime change 
decision of Bangladesh. 
 
So, it can be inferred from the above discussion that, the shift to market based 
floating exchange rate for the Taka in Bangladesh was a major development towards 
protecting country’s external competitiveness and insulating the country from adverse 
external shocks.  
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VI. Experience with the floating regime: 
The experience of Bangladesh under the floating exchange rate system is only three years 
plus which is yet very short to reach any significant conclusion. However, it is possible to 
draw an overview about the performance of the key economic indicators which will be 
helpful in drawing some policy recommendations. Though Bangladesh adopted the floating 
regime one month before the end of the fiscal year 2002-03 that is in May,2003, comparisons 
of the economic indicators are made over three post-regime fiscal years (July,03-June,06) 
with that of the previous three fiscal years(July,00- June,03) because of uniformity and 
computational advantage. In order to discern regime-specific behavior, the exchange rate 
characteristics of Bangladesh are compared between pre exit and post exit period. A 
similar exercise is carried out for interest rates, reserves, import, export, inflation etc. 
 
6.1 Volatility of exchange rate: 
It’s very remarkable that, fluctuations in exchange rate of Bangladesh taka against US dollar 
was not severe during its first three years under the new regime, compared to previous three 
years. As expected the exchange rate showed a relatively steady depreciation during this 
period from 58.4 in the month of July, 2003 to 69.71 in June 2006, a depreciation of 19.37 
percent over three fiscal years, with the highest level of 70.27 in March, 2006. 
 
Here log difference (percent) of Taka/USD can be used as a measure of fluctuations 
and volatility. Considering monthly exchange rates, the currency appreciated only seven 
times over this period. Comparing month to month, the currency depreciated to a maximum 
of 4.57 percent in March, 2006 and appreciated to a maximum of 1.05 percent in May, 
2006.(See figure 9)  
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Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the monthly exchange rate fluctuations 
(percentage change) over the sample period, 2003-06 and three sub samples. The mean was 
.52% and the standard deviation was only 1% for the full sample. Across sub samples, mean 
did not vary too much; standard deviations were low(less than 1%) during the first two sub 
samples compared to 1.39% in the third. All the sub samples showed positive skew ness 
though lower during the first two. Kurtosis were close to 3 during the first two sub samples, 
but again higher in the third.(See table 3 and 4) 
 
The result of low volatility is somehow striking, as it has been widely reported that 
exchange rates suffer significant increases in their volatilities when adopting floating 
regimes. A possible explanation of this can lie on the features of the financial markets of 
Bangladesh which lack significant levels of speculation due to a relatively small number of 
participants, low volume of transactions or non-existence of a broad set of financial 
instruments. 
 
A test for high frequency pegging was developed by Frankel and Wei (1994), and 
it has been used later by Baig (2001) and Cavoli & Rajan(2007) to characterize exchange 
rate regime. The approach involves using an independent currency as an arbitrary 
numeraire (Swiss franc) for measuring exchange rate variation against the U.S. dollar, 
Japanese yen, and German mark. The goal here is to estimate the weight a currency 
assigns to another currency for a given frequency.  
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A similar test is used here to characterize and compare the exchange rate regimes 
of Bangladesh during pre and post exit. The regression model, where the value of 
Bangladesh taka against the Swiss franc, is regressed against the major world currencies, 
is— 
 
dlog  
SF
BDT
  =  β1+ β2 dlog
SF
USD
 + β3 dlog
SF
GBP
 +  β4 dlog
SF
EUR
 + β5 dlog
SF
DEM
          
+ β6 dlog
SF
JPY
 + β6 dlog
SF
CAD
 
 
Here, 
BDT = Bangladeshi taka 
USD= United States dollar 
GBP= Great Britain pound 
EUR= Euro 
DEM = German mark 
JPY = Japanese Yen 
CAD = Canadian dollar 
Tow separate regressions, one using the monthly rates during 2000-01 to 2002-03 
and other for 2003-04 to 2005-06.The hypothesis to test is: The dollar coefficient is 
statistically indistinguishable from one (implying a peg type behavior).  
 
The regression results in table 5 and 6 show that in both the pre-exit and post exit 
years, the dollar coefficient are not very large (0.325407 and 0.435406 respectively) and in 
both cases the null hypothesis are rejected. Substantially lower adjusted R-squared 
results, suggest that the degree to which the currencies are linked to any of these major 
world currencies, is relatively less in case of Bangladesh. The pre exit regression result is 
consistent with Bangladesh’s policy of an adjustable basket peg using a real effective 
exchange rate (REER) target. 
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Comparison between Pre and Post exit regimes: 
 
 Pre exit Post exit 
 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
Exchange 
rate 
volatility 
0.0212 0.0045 0.0000 0.0046 0.0097 0.0139 
Interest 
rate 
volatility 
0.0265 0.0358 0.0165 0.0255 0.0365 0.0235 
Reserve 
volatility 
0.0887 0.1088 0.1115 0.0540 0.0727 0.0838 
 
 Pre exit (2000-03) Post exit (2003-06) 
USD coefficient .3254 0.4354 
t-statistics 
2.0760 
 
3.0458 
 
Adjusted R2 .5704 .6010 
Wald test 
( F statistics) 
18.52211 15.59934 
Probability 0.000185 0.000459 
 
6.2 Volatility of interest rate: 
Exchange rate volatility alone may not be sufficient to characterize the exchange rate 
regime, as the authorities could manipulate the exchange rate through interest rates 
changes or foreign exchange market transactions. We begin by looking at the volatility of 
interest rates, defined as the standard deviation of the percentage changes of the monthly 
weighted average rate of interest on commercial bank deposit. The interest rates are seen 
to be less volatile all along and there is not any marked difference in volatility between 
pre and post exit period. (See table 3.) 
 26 
6.3 Foreign Exchange Reserves: 
Foreign exchange reserves at the end of June 2006 stood at $3483.8 million which is all time 
highest in the history of Bangladesh. Compared to $2469.6 million dollar in June, 2003 the 
foreign exchange reserve recorded an impressive growth rate of 41.07percent in June, 2006. 
Not only that, volatility of reserves which is defined as the standard deviation of the 
percentage changes of monthly foreign exchange reserve, found to be lower during the 
post exit periods.(See table 3). Despite of this growth in foreign exchange reserve, because 
of even higher growth in import during these three years, foreign currency liquidity (reserve 
as percentage of import) slightly decreased from 25.57percent in FY2000-03 to 23.62percent 
in FY2005-06. 
 
6.4 Pass through: 
Changes in the exchange rate can have a mechanical counterpart in domestic price variations. 
As we have seen that Taka showed a relatively steady depreciation during the period and 
Bangladesh being a highly import oriented country, this may cause high inflation in 
Bangladesh. 
 
On a point-to-point basis, general inflation increased to 7.54 percent (8.81 percent for 
food item and 5.73 percent for non food) in June, 2006 from 5.14percent (5.76 percent for 
food item and 5.24 percent for non food) in July 2003. (See figure 10) 
 
It would be interesting to consider here the correlation matrix of exchange rate, 
general inflation, food inflation and non-food inflation to see whether the relatively steady 
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exchange rate depreciation and inflation were correlated during three fiscal years after the 
regime change. (See table 7) 
 
 During this period general inflation was most highly correlated with food inflation 
and only moderately correlated with exchange rate. But interesting thing is to note is that 
correlation between food inflation and exchange rate was very low. Non-food inflation was 
quiet low during most of the period and did not show much of a fluctuation and correlation 
between non-food inflation and exchange rate was quiet high. It gives us a hint that exchange 
rate depreciation might not be the major factor behind high level of inflation in Bangladesh 
during this period.  
 
6.5 Imports: 
Import payment in the first three years under the new regime recorded a positive growth 
compared to that of previous three years. As shown by actual import figures, imports during 
FY03-06 stood at $38896.3 million, which was 41.74 percent higher than that of fiscal year 
2000-03.  
Not only total import showed positive growth, what is interesting to see is that 
quarterly imports during fiscal years 2003-06 were also higher in all the four quarters 
compared to those in previous three years. (See figure 11)  Here July-September is 
considered as the first quarter of each fiscal year.  
 
This rising import figures during fiscal years 2003-06 should not be a matter of huge 
concern as, imports without food grains achieved impressive growth including 48.25 percent 
growth in textile and related articles, 58.22 percent growth in capital machinery, 64.66 
percent growth in dying and tanning materials, etc compared to that of fiscal years 2000-03. 
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6.7 Exports: 
Exports of Bangladesh during fiscal years 2003-06 also recorded positive growth compared 
to that of the previous three fiscal years. Total export receipt during that period stood at US$ 
26769.2 million, which was an impressive 40.8631 percent growth.  
 
Like the import sector, quarterly export receipts during fiscal years 2003-06 were also 
higher compared to those of previous three years, which is definitely a very good sign for the 
economy and gives a strong support in favor of the view that the new regime is helping 
Bangladesh export sector to regain its competitiveness in international market.(see figure 12) 
 
If we review the sector wise growth of the export receipts, the above claim can be 
strengthened further. Export earnings from ready made garment sector including knitwear 
and hosiery posted a growth of 68.69percent during these three fiscal years. Export of raw 
jute (58.89 percent), jute goods (29.06percent), leather (26.93 percent) and fish & shrimp 
(39.85 percent) also experienced quiet remarkable growth rates. Unfortunately, the export of 
tea experienced a negative growth of 5.9 percent during this period. Export of non-traditional 
items like ceramic and engineering goods also recorded very impressive growth figures.  
 
6.8 Remittance: 
In recent years remittance sent by expatriate Bangladeshi workers has become an 
increasingly important component of Bangladesh’s foreign exchange earnings. As was shown 
earlier, because of this higher flow, foreign currency liquidity of Bangladesh was somehow 
relieved over fiscal year 2001-02 and 2002-03 from the lowest ever level of 13.98 percent in 
fiscal year 2000-01.The impressive flow of foreign workers remittance has become even 
better after the regime change. During this three years, foreign exchange earnings from 
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remittance flows amounted to $11022.67 million, which was 48.05percent higher than the 
previous three years. 
 
6.9 Balance of Payments: 
Though export sector registered an impressive growth(40.86percent) during the first three 
years under the new regime, due to even higher growth (41.745percent) of imports, trade 
deficit increased from (-) $8438.8 million to (-) $12127.1 million, an increase of $3688.3 
million during the period. But the surplus of current account balance sustained in fiscal year 
2003-04 and 2005-06, but not in fiscal year 2004-05. The overall balance remained positive 
in all the three fiscal years under the new regime. 
 
6.10 Analysis of the findings: 
So, even though the duration under floating system is just three years, the above comparisons 
provide some signals about the performance of Bangladesh under the new policy. 
 
First of all, the fear of excess volatility of the currency proved wrong during the 
period. The country stepped to the new system in a smooth manner without any erratic 
movement in its exchange rate. Bangladesh Bank (BB) successfully maintained a stable 
and restrained monetary policy stance, shown by almost unwavering interest volatility to 
manage an orderly adjustment of Taka-Dollar exchange rates. This was well supported by 
a steady and less volatile foreign exchange reserve growth. Also the regression results 
showed that, US dollar was not assigned a major weight in determining the exchange rate 
of Bangladeshi Taka, both in pre exit and post exit era. 
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Secondly, in one and half years of post multi fiber arrangement period, there has not 
been any significant impact on the ready made garments sector of Bangladesh as speculated 
by different organizations. Especially due to the collective efforts of the ready made garments 
exporters and sensible decisions of the government, export in this sector has actually 
increased. 
 
 Then, not only overall export receipt showed positive growth figure, category 
wise growth figures were also impressive, which was one of the main target of the regime 
change. There are also signs of diversification in new non-traditional items. Positive export 
growth even after declining share of exports to US markets gives an idea that Bangladesh 
is also stepping out of the traditional markets. 
 
The trade balance was deteriorated due to the fact that, import also posited higher 
growth rate during the period. But, if we consider the import growth of capital goods and 
goods imported for the ready-made garments and other sectors, it rather gives an optimistic 
view and we can be hopeful that it will eventually lead to a J-curve effect. 
 
The one factor, about which Bangladesh Government should be careful about, is the 
rising trend of inflation. But the contention that devaluation has a significant effect on 
inflation might not be sustained for sure in case of Bangladesh as the elevated level of world 
commodity prices, mainly oil exerted significant inflationary pressures on both demand and 
supply sides in the domestic market. 
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VII. Conclusion: 
Despite a vast literature on the exchange rate determinants, choice of optimal exchange rate 
regime still remained as one of the major unresolved question of international 
macroeconomics. But it is not impossible to trace how and why a given country arrived at its 
current exchange rate regime and to what extent it can reap the benefit of the chosen regime. 
This paper exactly attempted to do that in case of Bangladesh. 
 
Once the market based floating system was adopted, Bangladesh should now 
encourage a greater focus on institutional reforms like improving bank and financial sector 
supervision, making the foreign exchange market deeper and more competitive, organizing 
the market for currency futures and options and thus building consensus for a sustainable and 
predictable monetary policy. A focus on financial development will provide more efficient 
and complete hedging opportunity against the exchange rate risk exposure and thus 
eliminating any possible negative effect of enhanced volatility in future.Any attempt to beat 
the market by targeting a specific value or to maintain a significant degree of intervention 
will enhance speculation and contradict with the foundations and targets of the new regime in 
Bangladesh. Only in moments of extraordinary turmoil and uncertainty, intervention can be 
carried out as an attempt to provide liquidity. But with the evolution of the market in the 
future in terms of higher depth and completeness, the need for direct intervention will be rare. 
 
Research on institutional development in developing countries is in its early stages, 
though developing rapidly. The possible connections between the new exchange rate regime 
of Bangladesh and the improvement of its institutions may be a potentially important topic 
for future research. 
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Figure 1: Foreign currency liquidity. 
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Figure 2: Inflation differential with main trading partners (1995=100). 
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Figure 3: Real effective exchange rate as of June (1995=100) 
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Figure 4: Credit to Government by the banking system 
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Figure 5: Foreign denominated liabilities. 
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Figure 6: Growth of exports. 
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Figure 7: Trade GDP ratio. 
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Figure 8: Terms of trade index. 
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Figure 9: Exchange rate fluctuation 
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Figure 10: Inflation on point to point basis 
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Figure 11: Quarterly Import from FY 2000-01 to 2005-06. 
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Figure 12: Quarterly export from FY 2000-01 2005-06. 
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Table 1: Growth of the RMG Sector in Bangladesh. 
Year RMG Export (US $Mil) Share in total exports (percent) 
1990-91 867 52.48 
1995-96 2547 65.5 
1999-2000 4351 75.7 
2000-2001 4860 75.14 
2001-2002 4583 76.56 
2002-03 4911 76.05 
 
Table 2: Balance of payment situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Trade 
Balance. 
 
Trade 
balance 
% of GDP 
C/A 
Balance. 
C/A 
Balance 
% of GDP. 
Remittance 
inflow. 
1990-91 -1840.7 -5.94 -149.2 -0.48 763.91 
1995-96 -3042.9 -7.47 -951.3 -2.34 1217.06 
2000-01 -2867.7 -6.10308 -803 -1.7 1882.10 
2001-02 -2553.9 -5.36859 243.4 0.51 2501.13 
2002-03 -3109.6 -5.98995 368.2 0.71 3061.97 
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Table 3: Pre and post exit volatility 
 Pre exit Post exit 
  
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
        
Exchange rate volatility 0.0212 0.0045 0.0000 0.0046 0.0097 0.0139 
        
Interest rate volatility 0.0265 0.0358 0.0165 0.0255 0.0365 0.0235 
        
Reserve volatility 0.0887 0.1088 0.1115 0.0540 0.0727 0.0838 
 
Table 4: Individual summary statistics of monthly exchange rate fluctuations 
 
 2003-06 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
Mean .005157 0.003468 0.00446 0.007542 
Median .002742 0.001046 0.002569 0.003815 
Maximum .045719 0.013245 0.023462 0.045719 
Minimum -.010526 -0.000224 -0.010148 -0.010526 
Std Dev. .009992 0.004578 0.009689 0.013892 
Skew ness 1.997103 1.023909 0.610813 1.767395 
Kurtosis 8.966649 2.619388 2.717221 6.005963 
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Table 5: Pre-exit regression output 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(BDT) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 19:40 
Sample(adjusted): 2000:08 2003:06 
Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.006137 0.002729 2.248455 0.0326 
DLOG(USD) 0.325407 0.156746 2.076013 0.0472 
DLOG(GBP) 0.487992 0.215626 2.263144 0.0316 
DLOG(EURO) 0.189032 0.387614 0.487681 0.6296 
DLOG(JPYEN) 0.090122 0.126687 0.711374 0.4827 
DLOG(GERMARK) 0.019983 0.023123 0.864174 0.3948 
DLOG(CANDOLLAR) 0.127946 0.179704 0.711979 0.4824 
R-squared 0.646249     Mean dependent var 0.010983 
Adjusted R-squared 0.570446     S.D. dependent var 0.022640 
S.E. of regression 0.014838     Akaike info criterion -5.406353 
Sum squared resid 0.006165     Schwarz criterion -5.095283 
Log likelihood 101.6112     F-statistic 8.525297 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.941601     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000026 
 
Wald Test: 
Equation: EQ02 
Null Hypothesis: C(2)=1 
F-statistic 18.52211  Probability 0.000185 
Chi-square 18.52211  Probability 0.000017 
 
Table 6: Post-exit regression output: 
Dependent Variable: DLOG(BDT) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 15:23 
Sample: 2003:07 2006:06 
Included observations: 36 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.008055 0.002834 2.842799 0.0081 
DLOG(USD) 0.435406 0.142950 3.045868 0.0049 
DLOG(GBP) 0.320974 0.260408 1.232580 0.2276 
DLOG(EURO) -31733.52 33064.02 -0.959760 0.3451 
DLOG(JPYEN) 0.023806 0.194185 0.122595 0.9033 
DLOG(GERMARK) 31733.37 33063.99 0.959756 0.3451 
DLOG(CANDOLLAR) 0.470531 0.168667 2.789698 0.0092 
R-squared 0.669456     Mean dependent var 0.006527 
Adjusted R-squared 0.601068     S.D. dependent var 0.024652 
S.E. of regression 0.015570     Akaike info criterion -5.314232 
Sum squared resid 0.007031     Schwarz criterion -5.006325 
Log likelihood 102.6562     F-statistic 9.789041 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.007385     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007 
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Wald Test: 
Equation: EQ02 
Null Hypothesis: C(2)=1 
F-statistic 15.59934  Probability 0.000459 
Chi-square 15.59934  Probability 0.000078 
 
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix between exchange rate and inflation 
 GENINF FOODINF NONFINF EXCH 
GENINF 1.000000 0.872507 0.422146 0.565629 
FOODINF 0.872507 1.000000 -0.050411 0.208922 
NONFINF 0.422146 -0.050411 1.000000 0.715882 
EXCH 0.565629 0.208922 0.715882 1.000000 
 
